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C. EDWIN BAKER, 1947–2009 
 The University of Pennsylvania Law School community was 
shocked and saddened to learn of the passing of C. Edwin Baker, the 
Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Communication, on De-
cember 8, 2009.  Professor Baker was a leading scholar of constitu-
tional law, free speech, and communications law, and he mentored 
and inspired many members of the Journal’s Board of Editors. 
The Board of Editors wishes to dedicate the twelfth volume of the 
Journal of Constitutional Law to the memory of Professor Baker.  We 
hope that the following Essays, written by his colleagues, help illus-
trate Professor Baker’s impact as a scholar, teacher, advocate, and 
colleague. 
—The Board of Editors 



























ED BAKER, COLLEAGUE 
Regina Austin*
As I reflect on my relationship with Ed Baker, I am amazed how 
much overlap there was in our time as Penn Law faculty members.  
Ed came to Penn in 1981, a mere four years after I returned to Penn 
as an assistant professor.  Ed, of course, was well ahead of me in terms 
of productivity and status in the profession. 
In the beginning, we read each other’s work.  He offered substan-
tive comments on mine while I proofread his.  Over time, I under-
stood less and less of what he was doing and he understood less and 
less of what I was doing.  Our minds simply did not work the same 
way.  He was methodically rigorous.  He was excited about talking 
theory.  I like reality and popular culture; I was excited by ethno-
graphies and documentaries.  His avocations were my vocations.  His 
fascination with print media and his reluctance to subscribe to cable 
television left me totally dumbfounded. 
But he remained my good colleague.  We would ride the rails to-
gether, down to Philadelphia, back up to New York.  Back and forth 
and back and forth.  He would often join me and my husband for 
Sunday brunches, sometimes with the likes of Walter Mosley and 
Danny Glover.  Ed hung with them and seemed to accept his role as 
the token white guy.  I will be eternally grateful for the protection he 
provided me from so much macho humanism.  At some point, I 
could take it no more, gave up, and moved back to Philadelphia to 
produce student videos.  Throughout it all, whether in NYC or Phila-
delphia, Ed and I talked about life at the Law School. 
We talked about teaching and the difficulties we encountered.  
Over time the students had become less politically liberal and more 
intellectually blasé.  Ed never blamed his teaching evaluations on 
that.  He was very concerned that he was not effective at getting his 
message across.  Ed’s commitment to the values of democracy was 
best reflected in and confirmed by his dealings with his students.  I do 
not recall his having groupies the way some professors do, but he 
touched many of his students in a most profound way.  Jo-Ann Ver-
rier, Vice Dean of Administration and Penn Law Class of 1983, shared 
 * William A. Schnader Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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with me the story of one of her classmates, Martha Manning, who had 
Ed Baker as a teacher when she was a first-year student at the Univer-
sity of Oregon Law School.  Jo-Ann writes:  When Ed Baker arrived at 
Penn Law, “he convinced the Admissions Office to accept Marty as a 
transfer student.  Well, she excelled here.  She did excellent work as a 
student while delivering twins her 3rd year.  She went to Morgan, 
Lewis & Bockius, then was general counsel at the Wistar Institute and 
now she’s Vice President and General Counsel at the international 
biopharma firm Sandoz. . . . Along the way, she’s had four more chil-
dren.”  Martha Manning acknowledges her debt to Ed Baker.  “He 
really made a difference in my life not only by opening the door to 
Penn Law School for me, but by his teaching.  When I was a 1L in his 
class at Oregon, he used the Socratic Method to teach me to think for 
myself—to come up with not only my own answers to his tough ques-
tions, but to come up with my own questions.  That is the most im-
portant skill I learned in law school and rely on every day in practice.  
He was truly instrumental in my legal education and [in] really teach-
ing me to think for myself.” 
Far more than teaching, though, we talked about the obstacles 
that stood in the way of our being members of a progressive and di-
versified faculty.  James Gimmelman, whom I do not know, offered 
the following comment on Ed’s Facebook page; there is truth in what 
he says:  “I only met Ed twice, but I’ll remember him vividly.  The first 
time was a talk on his theory of ‘complex democracy’ and I remem-
ber thinking that this was a man who truly loved democracy.  Not in a 
distant, abstracted, idealized way, but with a calm, contented, know-
ing, sad, and complex depth.  He gave it a lifetime of scholarly atten-
tion, and notwithstanding all the trends he decried, I like to think 
that his care was repaid.”  I am not so sure about that. 
For many academics who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s (like 
me and Ed and many of others here), our commitment to democratic 
rule is both expressed and practiced in the context of the university, 
particularly in areas of faculty governance. 
We fought many battles over the past thirty years.  We won some, 
and lost some, most notably the right to elect the appointments 
committee and the decision to grant tenure to Drucilla Cornell. 
Ed believed that balanced, cogent, tightly reasoned, disciplined 
analysis of the scholarship of candidates for appointment and tenure 
would be listened to and responded to in kind, even if his views did 
not ultimately prevail.  He poured his best efforts into the statements 
he put in files or read aloud at faculty meetings because his commit-
ment to collegial decision making demanded it.  After the meetings 
were over, he would ask me and others our opinions of his perform-
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ance.  He wanted confirmation of his views and feedback about areas 
where the analysis needed improvement.  As the number of people 
who placed a high priority on our having a progressive and diverse 
faculty dwindled, Ed’s words had less persuasive impact.  Ed was 
deeply disappointed and angry.  Yes, Ed got mad, but he was able to 
get on a train and travel to a more nurturing environment. 
I believe that Ed took our colleagues’ responses to his evaluations 
of the work of candidates for appointment and tenure and opinions 
about other issues of faculty governance personally.  I think he would 
have liked to have had more of an impact on our collective decisions 
because it would have represented recognition of his standing as a 
scholar and a thinker.  Despite his record of publications, his en-
gaged mind, his temperate disposition, his expansive network of aca-
demic friends and acquaintances, it appears that he served on the 
appointments committee only once and on the tenure and promo-
tions committee only twice.  Being able to influence the future course 
of the institution, to have colleagues who respect your intelligence 
and your contribution to the overall reputation of school, to have fel-
low scholars with whom one can really have deeply substantive discus-
sions is important to any true academic.  I think they were important 
to Ed.  Ed would have taken it as acknowledgment of his value to the 
Penn community if he had been asked to serve, if he had had more 
influence in a democratically governed community of scholars. 
But Ed was changing.  He seemed to have less need for external 
validation and vindication.  As Dean Robert Post of Yale has written 
of Ed:  “I believe his need for recognition and for acknowledgement 
diminished as [he] grew older and as the quality of his work became 
so indisputably foundational that even he could relax about the secu-
rity of its reception.” 
I hope that the outpouring of testimonials about Ed the scholar 
and theorist will cause some of my colleagues to reflect upon him and 
his scholarship anew.  It still matters. 
Ed was not the only one of my colleagues who died suddenly dur-
ing my tenure at Penn Law School.  There was another Ed, Ed 
Sparer, who had a fatal heart attack at his home in Woodstock.  He 
was a brilliant legal thinker too and a creative and caring activ-
ist/lawyer of welfare law and health law.  He too was not fully appre-
ciated.  Shortly before he died our new dean told him that he had 
been underpaid for years.  In the time since his death, he has become 
better regarded.  Now there is an annual symposium held in his 
honor.  But the faculty did not do the one thing that would have in-
dicated that it recognized the truly superlative quality of his intellect:  
that is, appoint someone to the faculty who was committed to carry-
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ing on his work.  Rather, the response might be characterized as 
cynical. 
I have found these words very hard to write.  If Ed were still alive I 
would have given him a draft and gotten his thoughts on whether the 
tone is right or whether I am merely speaking truth to petty power 
and should save my breath.  Worst yet, he might know if I was fore-
closing a window of hope and goodwill, no matter how small, that 
might lead to the result I want.  So many of our best efforts to seek a 
more progressive and diverse community have been met with the 
kind of response that makes one careful what one asks for.  I cannot 
guarantee that a fate like Ed Sparer’s will not befall my colleague Ed 
Baker.  The votes are not there.  I have moved on too.  The best I can 
do is go on record with my hope that Ed Baker’s scholarly commit-
ments to a diverse, progressive democratic order protected by a vi-
brant First Amendment will be reflected in future appointments to 
the Penn Law faculty and that if questioned you will attest to what I 





























A DEAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON ED BAKER 
Dean Michael Fitts 
Ed Baker was a unique scholar and individual—and will be deeply 
missed by his many intellectual colleagues and friends. 
As an academic he was widely recognized as one of the country’s 
preeminent scholars in the areas of First Amendment and communi-
cations law.   His four books were full of insights and genuinely origi-
nal thinking.  Two of them, in particular, were extremely influential 
and often cited: Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech and Media, Mar-
kets, and Democracy.  In the first, Ed propounded a liberal theory of the 
First Amendment that promoted free speech as a vehicle for progres-
sive change; in the second, he offered a sharp critique of deregula-
tion, calling it antithetical to a free press.  Both books received criti-
cal acclaim, and both will stand the test of time—the ultimate 
measure of academic depth and importance. 
The intellect that produced these works was as deep and playful in 
person as he was on the page.  Everyone recognized his boundless in-
tellect.  He was completely at home with the play of ideas.  We mar-
veled at his ability to draw on so many disciplines and weave them to-
gether so effortlessly in the service of incisive work that left people 
wondering why they hadn’t thought of that themselves. 
At the same time, Ed also used his extraordinary gifts to bend the 
world toward social justice.  For him, the personal was political.  That 
pursuit of justice led Ed to make common cause with the ACLU.  He 
was not afraid to call himself a card-carrying member.  He relished 
the role of championing the little guy and preserving people’s rights. 
All of these things—Ed’s prodigious intelligence, his love for the 
underdog and feisty defense of liberalism—are well-known to anyone 
who had the pleasure of knowing Ed.  Perhaps less well-known was his 
lack of pretension and genuine concern for those around him, what-
ever their station in life.  I worked with Ed when I was an aspiring aca-
demic and later as dean of this great law school.  And I can say with-
out reservation that Ed never changed his demeanor toward me.  
This kind, gentle, shy man remained friendly and personally suppor-
tive no matter our roles. 
I first met Ed when I was a young candidate for the faculty and I 
only knew of him through his publications.  He could have made me 
feel even more uncomfortable than I already was, but he did not.  
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Rather, he went out of his way to welcome me and to smooth my 
transition from government to academia. 
If anything, he was protective—championing me like he did the 
people who needed his help through the ACLU.  And I will never 
forget his kindness, at a time when I needed it. 
When I became dean, Ed and I continued to enjoy a warm rela-
tionship.  Academic life provides the best of all worlds, but, like poli-
tics, strains can develop over institutional policy.  And although Ed 
vigorously disagreed with some of the institution’s decisions, he never 
made it personal.  I thank him for this as well. 
I also remember Ed as the consummate scholar devoted to teach-
ing.  Ed did not put on airs in the classroom.  Neither showy nor dy-
namic, Ed nonetheless took his teaching responsibilities very seri-
ously.  He wanted his teaching to spark lively discussion.  At length he 
explained to me his teaching method.  His preparation was meticu-
lous and the results speak for themselves.  To many students he was 
an icon.  Upon hearing of his passing, a number of students visibly 
mourned.  They reminisced about the discussions that spilled out 
into the hallways, lasting well beyond class. 
Like these students, I feel a deep sense of loss for a renowned 
scholar, a wonderful colleague and a true friend.  I know I speak for 




















ED BAKER:  INSPIRATION BY A FRIENDLY SCHOLAR AND A 
SCHOLARLY FRIEND 
Friedrich Kübler*
Ed Baker joined the Penn Law Faculty in 1981.  During the fall of 
1983 I served as a visiting professor.  Ed and I quickly found out that 
we had a common interest in free speech and mass media issues, and 
we started to exchange our views and ideas.  Since 1985 I taught per-
manently, although not full time, at Penn.  Whenever he and I were 
there we would meet regularly, about once a week, to discuss our 
work and our projects. 
From the very beginning it was obvious that Ed was an extremely 
sophisticated and rigorous scholar, an excellent lawyer, and at the 
same time deeply familiar with economics, political science, media 
sociology, and philosophy.  In the late eighties or early nineties Jür-
gen Habermas, my colleague at the University of Frankfurt, visited 
Penn; I was in Germany at that time.  When I asked about the visit af-
ter his return he answered that it had been very interesting and plea-
sant and that he had been particularly impressed by a young philoso-
pher whose name was Ed Baker. 
Ed and I always agreed as to methodology and mostly on policy.  
In the analysis of speech and media issues he was nearly always one or 
more steps ahead of me, in spite of the fact that I am considerably 
older.  My main advantage had been that I am familiar with the Ger-
man mass media system and its European implications.  It contains 
elements, e.g., a strong public service segment in broadcasting, which 
he thought interesting.  The same was true for the British system 
which he knew better than I do.  He had a certain affinity to the val-
ues and virtues of “Old Europe.” 
In the late eighties he was finishing his seminal book, Human Lib-
erty and Freedom of Speech.1  Its central argument formed the basis for 
his future writings (and for mine).  He rejects the prevailing idea that 
freedom of speech is ultimately a functional right, serving the “mar-
ketplace of ideas.”  The First Amendment primarily protects the au-
 * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989). 
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tonomy and equality of individual speakers, their right of self-
determination by communicating with others. 
Speech is protected because, without disrespecting the autonomy of oth-
er persons, it promotes both the speaker’s self-fulfillment and the 
speaker’s ability to participate in change.  This leads to the conclusion 
that, as long as speech represents the freely chosen expression of the 
speaker, depends for its power on the free acceptance of the listener, and 
is not used in the context of a violent or coercive activity, freedom of 
speech represents a charter of liberty for noncoercive action.2
This does not completely exclude the functional justification, which 
remains valid where speech is not individual expression but the ad-
vertising or lobbying activity of (mostly huge) entities like corpora-
tions.  This corporate and/or commercial speech, which serves a spe-
cific communicative purpose, is therefore constitutionally protected, 
and can be regulated to ensure the democratic process and to protect 
individuals who are members of the organization and disagree with 
its propaganda.  This aspect is enormously important:  it justifies ef-
forts to regulate mass media in ways which would be intolerable when 
applied to individual speakers. 
In the nineties Ed shifted his interest to the particular issues of  
media regulation. His next book, Advertising and a Democratic Press,3 
contains a convincing description and explanation of how and why 
the dependence upon advertising revenues affects and distorts the 
content of mass media.  Then three major articles4 served as the basis 
for a third book, on Media, Markets, and Democracy.5  Its first part pre-
sents a brilliant analysis of the specific features of the economics of 
mass media.  Their products are “public goods” which allow nonrival-
rous use and make it difficult to exclude third parties (or free riders).  
In addition there are—positive and negative—externalities.  And the 
media operate on two markets:  they distribute news, editorials and 
entertainment to their recipients; and those form the audiences 
which are sold to the advertising industries.  There is strong evidence 
that this form of financing promotes concentration of newspaper and 
broadcasting business.  And finally, the media not only satisfy but also 
generate and modify the preferences of their recipients.  For all of 
these reasons a purely commercial media system is plagued by signifi-
cant market failures which are likely to degrade the communicative 
 2 Id. at 69. 
 3 C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994). 
 4 C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1357 
(2000); C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1998); C. 
Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311 (1997). 
 5 C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (2002). 
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services rendered to individuals and to the public.  The second part 
of the book discusses a broad spectrum of potential relief through 
content-neutral regulation.  The book concludes with very timely 
chapters on international trade in media products and on the impact 
of the internet and of digital technologies. 
In the beginning of 2000 I was asked by the German Association 
of Comparative Law to assist in the preparation of a program on me-
dia concentration and to present the comparative analysis of the na-
tional reports.  I suggested inviting Ed Baker to contribute a report 
on the ownership rules in U.S. broadcasting regulation.  He accepted, 
and a year later he sent me a text which was at the same time a com-
prehensive description and a brilliant evaluation of the American de-
velopment.6  The comparative law conference took place in Ham-
burg, in September 2001, only few days after the terrorist attack 
killing thousands of people and destroying the World Trade Center 
in New York.  Ed was visiting with NYU and felt that he should not 
leave his students at that moment.  But even in his absence it was his 
text which dominated the debate:  he had provided the conceptual 
framework for the discussion of policies.  In particular, he argued 
that for compelling reasons ownership rules cannot be substituted.  
In the Hamburg discussion his view prevailed against the strong op-
position of the German Cartel Office, which viewed media specific 
ownership rules as an undesirable interference with its own powers.  
For Ed, his contribution to the conference became the starting point 
for his latest and last book, Media Concentration and Democracy:  Why 
Ownership Matters.7  This is another classic text—an enormously care-
ful and nearly exhaustive explication of the relevant policy argu-
ments, making it very clear that a democratic system will face inac-
ceptable risks once media power is no longer constrained by 
ownership rules.  In between Ed and I had co-authored a short article 
in German explaining and criticizing the new ownership policy the 
FCC wanted to adopt in the early years of the century.8
 6 C. Edwin Baker, The Law and Policy of Media Ownership in the United States, in 
MEDIENKONZENTRATION UND ANGEBOTSVIELFALT ZWISCHEN KARTELL- UND 
RUNDFUNKRECHT 9 (Uwe Blaurock ed., 2002). 
 7 C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY:  WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS 
(2007).  A summary of his argument had been presented at the Penn Law School Faculty 
Retreat 2005; I had been invited to comment on his paper. 
 8 C. Edwin Baker & Friedrich Kübler, Sicherung der Meinungsvielfalt durch mehr Markt?, 2004 
MEDIA PERSPEKTIVEN 81. 
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Two years ago I finally finished and published my book on the 
German system of mass communication law.9  In the preface I could 
and I did write without any exaggeration that nobody had exercised 
as much influence on the content of this book, and on my way of 
thinking about freedom of speech and mass media regulation, than 
Ed Baker.  Today I have difficulty disentangling which insights I de-
rived from reading his books and articles, and what I gained from our 
continuing conversations and discussions.  But I have no doubt that 
for his and for my generation Ed has elaborated the most compre-
hensive and the most persuasive theories how to understand constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and how to transform this interpreta-
tion into policies which will serve the public on the long run; if there 
is anything better, I have not seen it.  So I am very sorry that I lost a 
vital source of information and education.  But there is more. Ed had 
been the model of an academic, fully dedicated to his students and to 
his scholarship, unpretentious and kind, but unconditionally commit-
ted to principles of intellectual integrity and social justice.  And he 
was a wonderful friend. I am deeply saddened by the loss, but I am 
happy whenever I remember our relationship. 





“THE FULL PERSON AS REASON-GIVER”:   
THE LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION  
OF C. EDWIN BAKER 
Frank I. Michelman*
My theme is Ed Baker’s scholarly involvements with large ques-
tions of political equality, democracy, liberty, and justice.  I envision 
my friend as having been engaged in the construction of a full-
fledged liberal constitutional conception, on the scale of those ad-
vanced by writers like John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Jürgen 
Habermas.  I cannot, with certainty, say when (or, indeed, whether) a 
project of such a scope may have taken conscious shape in Professor 
Baker’s mind.  One might, if so inclined, see portents in Ed’s earliest 
published articles, from 1974 and 1975.1
I pick up the trail in the middle, with a 1989 paper on Republican 
Liberalism.2  This may not be one of Ed’s most widely noted works.  It 
has, however, a special resonance for me, because Ed chose to write it 
in the form of a rather stern (and may I also say a richly deserved!) 
rebuke to some then-current work of mine.  In that paper, we find Ed 
in search of foundations for a defense of liberal constitutionalism.  
He does not buy into the contract tradition that we associate with 
John Rawls.3  But then neither does he tie liberal rights—as Ronald 
Dworkin has done—to an abstract ethical theory positing the special 
responsibility of each person for the conception and pursuit of value 
in the life that is hers.4  Rather, Ed proposes, in that paper, to draw 
his foundations for a liberal constitutional order from a kind of Ha-
 * Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.  The following tribute is drawn 
from my remarks at a memorial service for Professor Baker held in New York on January 
30, 2010. 
 1 C. Edwin Baker, Utility and Rights:  Two Justifications for State Action Increasing Equality, 84 
YALE L.J. 39 (1974); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 3 (1975). 
 2 C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism:  Liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L. REV. 
491 (1989) [hereinafter Baker, Liberal Rights]. 
 3 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–17 (1971). 
 4 See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE:  PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL 
DEBATE 9–21 (2006); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE:  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF EQUALITY 242–84 (2000). 
950 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
bermasian philosophic anthropology, a conception of persons as, es-
sentially, participants in communicative action.5
The “key move” in his case for liberal constitutionalism, Professor 
Baker wrote in that 1989 paper, would be a claim that “communica-
tive action is [a constitutive] part . . . of our present, historical nature 
as persons.”6  The case for treating liberal rights as foundational in a 
practice of democratic politics should be drawn, Ed wrote, from what 
he called “our experiential commitment to communicative action.”7  
If we are going to concede obligatory force to the lawmaking out-
comes of democratic political debate, then (as Ed maintained) we 
need to “redeem” the “validity claims” implicit in each person’s con-
tribution to the lawmaking debate.8  And that is where liberal rights 
would come in:  as supports for validity in the debate—or call it sup-
port for the debate’s commandingness of respect.  Collective com-
mitment to regard for the equality and autonomy of individuals, Ed 
argued, is presupposed by the conduct of a joint practice of lawmak-
ing among persons inevitably, essentially bound to what Habermas 
came to call the “ethics” of “discourse.”9
That may sound to you a lot like Jürgen Habermas writing on con-
stitutional theory, in his great book on that topic, Between Facts and 
Norms.10  Facts and Norms appeared in print (in English) in 1996.11  Ed 
was writing in 1989—anticipating, it seems, the directions that a lib-
eral constitutional theory inspired by Habermasian discourse ethics 
might take. 
I will push the comparison further.  There is, in Ed’s paper of 
1989, a clear premonition of an idea that Habermas would come to 
label “the co-originality of public and private autonomy.”12  Not only 
is it true (Ed wrote) that a practice of deliberative politics presup-
 5 See generally 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:  LIFEWORLD 
AND SYSTEM:  A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981); 1 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:  REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981). 
 6 Baker, Liberal Rights, supra note 2, at 514. 
 7 Id. at 515. 
 8 Id. at 514. 
 9 See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43–115 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1990) (a chapter entitled Discourse Ethics:  Notes on a Program of 
Philosophical Justification). 
 10 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:  CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 104 (William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter 
HABERMAS, NORMS]. 
 11 The German language original is JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG; BEITRÄGE 
ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS (1992). 
 12 E.g., HABERMAS, NORMS, supra note 10, at 104. 
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poses individual rights of self-determination; it is also true that there 
are presuppositions embedded in the very idea of an individual’s self-
determination, and those include “a realm of deliberative politics in 
which a person determines her social environment and situation 
[and thus herself] through deliberative participation in collective 
creation.”13  In Ed’s writings on the First Amendment, that thought 
takes shape as a constitutionally preferred, individual right to “par-
ticipation in change.”14  In Ed’s more broadly political-theoretic work, 
that thought becomes a ground for rejecting demands—supported, 
in different ways, by both Rawls15 and Dworkin16—for the sort of lib-
eral neutrality that would exclude socially contested ethical convic-
tions, regarding the substance of the good for humankind, from col-
lective determinations of coercive law. 
The argument that Ed sketched out in 1989 would, in later years, 
evolve.  It would thicken.  Ed developed it in scholarly interrogations 
of Rawls,17 of Dworkin,18 and of Habermas,19 taking issue with all of 
them.  And, yes, that does include Habermas, too, on the point of ty-
ing political legitimacy to each person’s supposedly being able to see 
herself as an autonomous author of all the laws in force.  Ed was leery 
of that idea.20  He thought it tended dangerously toward the evacua-
tion of ethical contestation from democratic debate.  Professor Baker, 
as we see, was tilting with giants in his field.  (In my mind’s eye, I see 
on Ed’s face, as he tilted, that characteristic, slightly wry, self-
deprecating smile.  Well, maybe not so self-deprecating; let us, rather, 
 13 The interpolation is mine, but necessary to convey the full, dialectical flavor of Ed’s 
thought, as shown by other passages and writings.  See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, In Hedgehog 
Solidarity, 90 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 35–36, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Baker, Solidarity]; C. Edwin Baker, Two Interpretations of Liberalism:  Neu-
trality Versus Toleration 23–24, 28 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) 
[hereinafter Baker, Two Interpretations]. 
 14 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47, 48, 81 (1989). 
 15 See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
 16 See Frank I. Michelman, Foxy Freedom?, 90 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (describing and ana-
lyzing Dworkin’s view as developed in a draft of RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010)). 
 17 See C. Edwin Baker, Rawls, Equality, and Democracy, 34 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 203 (2008) 
[hereinafter Baker, Rawls]; C. Edwin Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 895 
(1985). 
 18 See Baker, Solidarity, supra note 13. 
 19 See Baker, Two Interpretations, supra note 13. 
 20 See id. at 5, 13–15.  Self-authorship of the laws became a bit of a bone of contention be-
tween the two of us.  See id. at 5 n.7; Frank I. Michelman, A Reply to Baker and Balkin, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 649, 651 (2004) (conceding a point to C. Edwin Baker, Michelman on Consti-
tutional Democracy, 39 TULSA L. REV. 511, 521 (2004)). 
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say that smile of quiet, unassuming confidence and joy in his own 
powers to contribute.) 
It seems to me that Ed’s evolving, communicative-ethics inspired, 
liberal constitutional conception was coming to a boil in what I must 
now, sadly, refer to as his “late” work.  It looks as though pieces are 
being set in place for a sort of summative statement.  I have in mind 
Ed’s article. Rawls, Equality, and Democracy, published in 2008;21 his 
large essay on Dworkin’s not-yet-published Justice for Hedgehogs, left by 
Ed at his death for publication in a forthcoming law review sympo-
sium;22 also, an unpublished manuscript on Two Interpretations of Lib-
eralism:  Neutrality Versus Toleration, that I was lucky to receive from Ed 
just a few months ago.23
In the Dworkin essay, Ed takes up Dworkin’s idea of each person’s 
special responsibility for living well his own life, viewed as a key aspect 
of human dignity.  From that idea, Dworkin infers a moral prohibi-
tion against legislation meant to impose a collective view of ethical 
value on individuals responsible to work out such matters for them-
selves.24  Ed draws a different lesson.  “People’s special responsibility 
for their own lives,” he insisted, requires that “people be able to pur-
sue their visions [of what makes for value in human lives] in all their 
roles, including collective governance.”25  His difference with Dwor-
kin on this point, Ed suggests, turns on a question about the best 
conception “of the person and her dignity.”26  Much as he had done 
in his paper of 1989, Ed asks us to “imagine a person” as essentially a 
communicative agent, “an interactive giver” of reasons in exchange 
with others—any and all “reasons she finds best,” including reasons of 
the good for human lives—in any and all social venues, including ve-
nues of lawmaking.27  Respect for “the full person as reason-giver” en-
tails, Ed argued, acceptance of “a political realm where people pur-
sue, as communicative agents, their inevitably conflicting values,” and 
not everyone can come out a winner every time.28
Ed Baker himself modeled the debate from which everyone wins.  
He did so—it is just an example—as a devoted participant, over the 
past ten or so years, in an annual, cross-disciplinary colloquium, now 
held in Prague, where people discuss work connected in some way to 
 21 See Baker, Rawls, supra note 17. 
 22 See Baker, Solidarity, supra note 13. 
 23 See Baker, Two Interpretations, supra note 13. 
 24 See supra notes 4, 16, and accompanying text. 
 25 Baker, Solidarity, supra note 13. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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the critical-theoretic tradition that gave rise to the theories of com-
municative action and discourse ethics.  The colloquium is, in fact, a 
direct descendant of a series of meetings first organized, decades ago, 
by Jürgen Habermas.  Over these recent years, “Prague” has been a 
group in which Ed’s voice was deeply respected, highly valued, and 
much loved.  It was I who first brought Ed to Prague, and I am very 
proud of that; I did a good thing there.  Much of Ed’s later work got 
airings in Prague.  We had the blessing, there, of Ed’s presence—of 
Ed giving reasons, Ed getting reasons, Ed giving respect, Ed getting 
respect, Ed giving and getting the affection—the love—that flowed 
from and flowed to the full person that he was:  the giver of reasons, 





REMEMBERING ED BAKER 
Monroe E. Price*
Ed Baker had the intense purpose of biblical prophecy. 
He was against the grain; he foresaw deep and terrible decline; 
and he railed against it (in his own quiet way).  Like many prophets 
of yore, he saw his understandings rejected by those he thought had a 
more limited moral compass, a more limited grasp of the world, or a 
more limited sense of the promise of American society. And like 
many prophets, he was at heart an idealist.  We shall wonder how Ed 
became who he so gracefully was:  this combination—in one of those 
astounding tricks of American social life—multi-generational Madi-
sonville, Kentucky, Italian immigrant, Wyoming ranch grit, and Emer-
sonian Yale Law School graduate. 
Ed was a prophet with influence.  When I was scurrying about the 
Internet, trying to see his influence, I found an article, published in 
1992, with a title that captured what he accomplished:  First Amend-
ment Theories and Press Responsibility:  The Work of Zechariah Chafee, Tho-
mas Emerson, Vincent Blasi and Edwin Baker.1
This is where Ed belongs:  in the Valhalla of heroes of free expres-
sion jurisprudence. 
I looked up how many professors and students, writers of law re-
view articles,  expressed their thanks to Ed.  It is in the hundreds.  By 
the way, twice as many thanked “Ed Baker” as thanked C. Edwin 
Baker, and I thought that was a sign of who Ed was. 
But even in this academic ritual, Ed could show the railing part of 
his prophetic side. 
For example, a future colleague of Ed’s at Penn sent a nice bou-
quet to Ed in his acknowledgements in an article on media policy:   
I would like to offer special thanks to my friend, Ed Baker, for his will-
ingness to engage in the lively and constructive intellectual exchange 
about my ideas appearing in this Article.  I can offer no higher praise 
 * Director, Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School of Communica-
tion, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law. 
 1 Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, First Amendment Theories and Press Responsibility:  The Work of 
Zechariah Chafee, Thomas Emerson, Vincent Blasi and Edwin Baker, 6 JOURNALISM Q. 48 
(1992). 
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than to say that I have spent much of my career inspired by and respond-
ing to his work.2
This graceful comment triggered Ed the prophet.  Even to a bril-
liant scholar who had complimented him, Ed could be churlish, even 
raging.  He saw this interlocutor as representative of a group of me-
dia law scholars who were what Ed called “free market acolytes.”  
Here’s his reply in prophetic mode:  “This short Comment on his ar-
ticle . . . is written not because I consider it uniquely objectionable, 
but rather because its fundamental errors and characteristic distor-
tions are representative of this influential group of scholars.”3
Or to two other colleagues:  “After a generally entertaining and 
informative narrative of the Nike litigation, [the authors] conclude 
with a disturbingly bad attempt at constitutional analysis—a point I 
will illustrate only briefly here before turning to their equally bad 
mischaracterizationof my Essay.”4  And these were to friends! 
In his pretty much lonely prophecy, Ed saw the role of the press in 
society as fundamentally constitutive—as a necessary element in cre-
ating an informed public and in empowering individuals to perform 
their civic roles.  For him media companies and media institutions 
had to be subject to social adjustment to make sure their functions 
could be adequately performed. 
He found meaning in the strange yet uncharted formula of the 
First Amendment, which protects, serially, freedom of speech and of 
the press.  And these last four words “or of the press” have been a 
mystery to scholars and judges.5  Ed had a philosophy of why there 
were these two clauses—and why each was separately and differently 
important for the adventure of American constitutionalism. 
His prophetic sirens rang out the tyranny of concentrated owner-
ship and the tyranny as well of pervasive, overwhelming advertising 
on editorial decisions.  These as much as government could corrupt 
the true role of the media.  It is ironic or tragic that just at the time of 
his death, his voice on this question becomes more and more vital.  
Some months ago, he traveled to Washington to testify on the role 
government should play in making certain there’s a vital press in the 
 2 Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 669 n.* 
(2005). 
 3 C. Edwin Baker, Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 733, 733 (2005). 
 4 C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom:  The Commercial Speech Quandary in 
Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1184 (2004). 
 5 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (excepted from Potter Stew-
art, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial 
Convocation (Nov. 2, 1994)). 
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United States.  He testified before a Congressional Committee—to 
provide them with a short history lesson on speech and society as he 
saw the subject in U.S. history—and how to react to whatever crisis 
journalism faces.  His approach was typically Ed:  claiming that the 
“market cannot be expected to adequately support professional qual-
ity journalism. . . . [and that t]his inadequacy of the market was rec-
ognized at the country’s founding and through most of the country’s 
first 200 years.”6  He wanted to open a space for some creative ap-
proaches with a public initiative.  Here as elsewhere, his was an un-
usual voice, using the scholarly mantle to help be an architect of a 
more democratic world.  And last year, as well, he met with a commit-
tee of the House of Lords. 
Ed was a prophet with humor and here’s Ed’s idea of a First 
Amendment joke (in an article on the First Amendment in cyber-
space):   
I have argued that the channeling approved in Pacifica [a famous Su-
preme Court case] may make sense.  Channeling that would, however, 
keep indecency off the broadcast system from six o’clock in the morning 
till ten or twelve o’clock at night should be unconstitutional.  Such regu-
lation would reduce the availability of indecency to people like me, who 
go to bed early in order to take the train from New York to Philadelphia.  
It would mean that I could not watch indecency on broadcast at 8 or 9 in 
the evening, when I am still somewhat awake.7
What Norman Dorsen wrote about Ed’s mentor, Tommy Emerson 
applies to Ed:  “There is no way to do justice to a man so deep and 
humane.  He is as addicted to concepts of fairness and equality . . . . 
[His writings] are more than merely authoritative:  they are works 
which reordered the line of inquiry for those who have come after.” 
Ed danced to his own drummer, but what a drummer that was. 
Ed had that quiet modest quality in which he claimed not to be 
“lecturing” in the sense of telling people what they should do; but all 
the while he was demonstrating an allegiance to basic legal and moral 
principles that were so inspiring that they transcended national bor-
ders and cultural differences. 
We had a regular effort to meet on the train going to or from 
Philadelphia.  He always sat in the Café Car—the open tables ap-
pealed to him, and he used the time to read the papers that might be 
 6 A New Age for Newspapers, Diversity of Voices, Competition and the Internet:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 
(2009) (statement of C. Edwin Baker, Professor, Univ. of Pa.). 
 7 Norman Dorsen, Thomas Irwin Emerson, 85 YALE L.J. 463, 464–66 (1976) (quoting Louis H. 
Pollak, Thomas I. Emerson, Lawyer and Scholar:  Ipse Custodiet Custodes, 84 YALE L.J. 638, 
638 (1975)). 
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given by a faculty member at lunch, or take a last look at the assign-
ments he had made, but he always made time to talk about his view of 
some freedom of expression related matter.  Several were the times 
when I rued the punctuality of Amtrak at arriving in New York, de-
priving me of yet another of Ed’s thoughts, which were always there 
in great supply. 
He was an invaluable colleague for me.  When, as part of Annen-
berg’s center for global communication studies, I wanted a voice to 
represent the best of American (or beyond) thinking on speech and 
society, Ed would be the first person I turned to.  In the summer of 
2009, for example, he went to Beijing to lecture in a series of semi-
nars for graduate students in China.  A year or two earlier, he gave of 
his time to go to Jordan and talk with young Jordanians, to lawyers, 
law professors, and journalists about his conception of the role of 
speech in society.  I was most fortunate to know Ed and see his gen-
erosity with young people around the world.  In Jordan, in Hungary, 
in China just this last summer, Ed was the perfect exponent of a cul-
ture of discussion, understanding, exploring basic concepts.  He met 
with young Jordanian women in headscarves and blue jeans, with 
Chinese scholars eager to be respected but also be informed, worlds 
of people who were specially able to benefit from Ed’s special brand 
of listening, telling, being open but having a firm set of ideas. 
I was touched by their uniform reaction to Ed’s death, testimony 
about how much Ed had meant to them, and how distressed they are 
that they cannot engage him in yet another conversation, have yet 
another discussion.  In all of these instances, he wanted to make it 
clear that he was not preaching; he wanted his audiences to have a 
better understanding of the complexities of the U.S. perspectives on 
speech, press and society so that they could bring a more discriminat-
ing view to their own dilemmas.  He was a quiet and persistent mis-
sionary for his own very exacting and compelling view of the First 
Amendment and international norms of free speech. 
In Amman, among the students Ed talked to, formally and infor-
mally, a group of young women were charmed by this intense, sin-
cere, curious American, who was willing to listen to them and who 
seemed to appreciate their intriguing way of adjusting to a globalised 
modernity.  I remember, for example, his puzzled look when one or 
two young women asked him for his opinion on honor killing, appar-
ently a problem that wasn’t merely speculative for them. 
Here’s a note from Zhan Li, a young professor in Xiamen, in Chi-
na, when I told her Ed Baker would come:  “Of course I know how 
wonderful Prof. Baker is—his Media, Markets, and Democracy was a big 
part of the theoretical framework of my dissertation, but I didn’t have 
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a chance to meet him in person on Penn campus.  Thanks so much 
for giving me the opportunity!”  Just recently, another acolyte from 
his China trip, Sixin Wang, a rising professor at the Communications 
University of China in Beijing, arranged for a scholarship to come to 
Penn for a year primarily to learn from Ed. 
I remember, too the period in which Ed was one of the few 
American voices that took seriously French, Canadian and other ef-
forts to maintain cultural identity by regulating trade in television 
programs or songs or magazines.  Ed wanted to master this area and 
set forth a comprehensive approach to it.  And he did it in his usual 
painstaking fashion, but then put, pretty much, full stop to that issue 
and turned to something else. 
Just before his death, I heard him intervene in a colloquium on 
hate speech and, as usual, he sought to move the speaker (in this case 
Columbia’s Jeremy Waldron) off what might have otherwise been a 
pedestal of self-confidence about a position—in this case the role of 
speech regulation as a way of affording dignity to scorned minorities.  
And in our last conversation, he was trying to instruct me in the dif-
ference between a “tolerant” society and a “neutral” society with re-
spect to speech practices.  My wife and I had lunch with Ed the day 
before he died.  He was full of hope and anticipation and enthusiastic 
love (an important quality).  His tone that day came back to me as I 
read a sentence he wrote (in an essay about Catherine McKinnon: 
Anyone with an ultimate faith in people—and in humanity—is likely to 
share the inevitably unprovable belief that legal regimes premised on re-
spect for people’s agency will ultimately lead to the best results, the best 
society.  At least they are likely to share the belief that because life is a 
continual process of becoming without final outcomes, this approach is 










 8 C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1211 (1994) (review-





REMEMBERING ED BAKER 
David Rudovsky*
Ed Baker died suddenly and all too early in his engaging and pro-
ductive life at the age of sixty-two.  Ed was a prodigious scholar, a 
committed civil libertarian, a revered teacher at Penn Law School, 
and an individual whose passion for justice and fairness animated all 
parts of his life.  His work on First Amendment issues of free speech 
and association were ground-breaking in legal and philosophic cir-
cles; in particular, his theories of free speech with respect to the rela-
tionship of the media to the citizenry and to the political system were 
both illuminating and comprehensive.  His discussions of the proper 
functions of the First Amendment reflected insightful research, a 
strong sense of history, and a broad understanding of the role of free 
speech in the culture of the United States.  No wonder that his four 
major books on freedom of expression were translated into several 
foreign languages and that he was a frequent lecturer here in the 
United States and around the world.  He had a passion for life, for 
personal liberties, and for integrity in scholarship and teaching. 
For years, as a colleague at Penn, I admired Ed’s academic work 
and his understanding of constitutional doctrines.  I also valued the 
times we had together talking about politics, law, and teaching.  His 
comments were always wise and his modesty genuine.  He was quiet 
and reserved, and often absorbed by his projects, but he always had 
the time to connect on a personal level. 
The theories and philosophies that have been generated by First 
Amendment scholars are sometimes daunting in their complexity 
and nuances.  But Ed had a way of both developing complex theories 
and applying them in a way that made eminent good sense.  Even so, 
I did not have much occasion to use Ed’s work in actual litigation un-
til a number of the Penn Law Faculty decided to file suit against the 
Solomon Amendment (which terminated federal funding to any uni-
versity that did not provide the military with equal recruitment ser-
vices).  I was part of a team of lawyers that represented the faculty 
members on their claim that the federal law impermissibly prevented 
the Law School from enforcing its anti-discrimination policies as the 
 * David Rudovsky is a Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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military discriminated against gays and lesbians.  Who knew that Ed’s 
perceptions and thoughtfulness would be so critical to our agenda. 
We had to sort through an array of possible arguments and doc-
trines that would support the legal claims, and several of these argu-
ments involved free speech and association issues.  Early on, Ed wrote 
a memorandum setting forth the core First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment arguments in support of the Law School’s right to enforce its 
anti-discrimination policies.  The challenge for me was to translate 
Ed’s academic understandings of First and Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine into functional arguments for a district court judge.  At first, 
some of what Ed wrote seemed too abstract, but as I worked through 
his thought process, and applied his thinking to the issues at hand, I 
soon found myself with a well-integrated approach to the issues that 
would be presented by our case.  Ed was persistent in his views, but 
also fully understood the realties of litigation against the military so 
soon after 9/11.  Our legal briefs were very much the product of his 
thinking and advice, and fully supported our statutory construction 
theory.  Unfortunately, Congress eventually mooted our winning ar-
guments by a statutory amendment and, in a separate case, the Su-
preme Court found no constitutional problems with the federal law. 
But Ed was far more than an academic when it came to this kind 
of issue.  With legal challenges swept aside, he and others at Penn 
and other law schools re-engaged with student activists to directly 
protest the military’s policies, including demonstrations and other ac-
tivities surrounding visits by military recruiters.  These protest activi-
ties have helped to broaden the campaign against “Don’t Ask; Don’t 
Tell.”  And some day soon, Ed’s vision of fairness and equality will 
prevail, not because a court agreed, but because the country will fi-
nally reject policies built on bigotry and discrimination.  That devel-

















ED BAKER:  FRIEND AND FIRST AMENDMENT SCHOLAR 
Steven Shiffrin*
I want to discuss what Ed Baker meant to me, but my primary re-
sponsibility is to present his vision of the First Amendment:  to tell 
you what Ed believed, what Ed wrote, what Ed fought for, fiercely 
fought for in public and in private even when presented in a quiet, 
considerate Kentucky drawl. 
It all begins in the fourth grade.  Ed’s parents, to whom he dedi-
cated his first book, wanted to take him to the Episcopalian church.  
Ed told them he had a First Amendment right not to go.  In the tenth 
grade he wrote a paper on the First Amendment inspired by John 
Stuart Mill.  In law school, Ed studied under the greatest First 
Amendment scholar of his generation, Thomas Emerson.  There Ed 
wrote a paper that became the basis for his first great book on the 
First Amendment:  Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech. 
In that book he broke with Mill and with Emerson, but he held 
fast to what he knew in the fourth grade. 
The building block for his theory was that human beings are 
equally entitled to be respected by government as autonomous 
agents.  He believed that people had a right to make their own com-
mitments and live out those commitments without state interference 
except in extraordinary circumstances.  He called this the liberty the-
ory of the First Amendment. 
Ed’s approach had no room for the marketplace of ideas theory.  
Ed thought among other things that we know too much about the so-
ciology of knowledge to accept that sunny view.  Ed recognized that 
what emerges in the marketplace may tell us more about upbringing, 
bias, and power than it tells us about truth. 
Ed also rejected Mill’s idea that liberty could be restricted when it 
harmed the interests of others.  Harm was too slippery a concept for 
Ed, and he recognized that the harm idea led to judicial balancing, 
which he opposed for many reasons including its subjectivity and its 
tendency to ratify the status quo.  Ed also rejected Emerson’s theory 
that speech should be protected but action should not.  Ed argued 
that freely chosen speech should be protected unless it physically in-
 * Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. 
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jured or coerced another, and he rigorously defined coercion in a 
way that would leave little wiggle room for judges.  Similarly, he ar-
gued that action that was substantively valued should receive equiva-
lent protection. 
In so doing, Ed improved on the work of First Amendment giants 
like Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and Thomas Emerson.  He was 
the premier defender of the core of the ACLU position on free 
speech.  And Ed’s theory is not just abstract. It is backed by a passion 
he shared with John Stuart Mill, the part that emphasized the impor-
tance of diversity, of experimentation, of independence, of resistance 
to authority, and the value those qualities play in individual self-
realization and building the culture. 
But Ed’s free speech theory protected human beings.  It did not 
protect business corporations.  He would have been appalled by the 
recent Supreme Court decision protecting corporations.  Ed argued 
for more than thirty years that the speech of business corporations 
was not an exercise of liberty.  Ed maintained that corporate speech 
was not the speech of the shareholders, and it was not the speech of 
officers and directors.  Corporate speech was dictated by the competi-
tive business needs of the corporation wholly apart from the personal 
beliefs of shareholders, officers, and directors.  In short, inhuman 
corporate speech, for Ed, was not an exercise of human liberty. 
In looking at Ed’s work, some scholars have been better at packag-
ing.  Perhaps some scholars have been as smart.  But no one has been 
as deep; no one as broad; no one as creative; no one as original.  And 
when you put his forty articles and four books together, I do not be-
lieve that anyone has made as important an intellectual contribution 
to the First Amendment as Ed Baker, whether in this century or the 
last. 
I, of course, will miss his continuing scholarship, but I also miss 
more.  I miss those long pauses when I made an argument and Ed 
mulled over his response.  I will miss his total lack of defensiveness.  
He always wanted to get the right answer even if it meant changing a 
past position.  I miss his thoroughgoing integrity.  Nietzsche once 
said that to have a system—as Ed did—was to lack integrity.  He 
thought that anyone with a system would fudge it to get desirable re-
sults.  Well Nietzsche never met Ed Baker. 
Most of all I miss his kindness, his self-deprecating humor, and I 
miss that he did not wear his brilliance on his sleeve, though you 
would have to been a moron to miss it. 
Finally, I smile at the fact that Ed wrote much of his last two books 
in Claude’s, that great French bakery on 4th Street in New York.  I 
can just see him sipping coffee at that little table and, despite people 
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pushing into the cramped store, I see him working with enormous 
concentration and discipline—though I can see him looking up when 
a friend came through the door as I once did.  Ed had a wonderful 
capacity to nourish and maintain friendships with many people, 
friendships that sometimes have gone for thirty to forty years.  Ed’s 
ability to connect with people is a major source of the misery that ac-
companies his passing.  Certainly, Ed’s death has made me miserable.  
But I am consoled and I think we all can be consoled by the fact that 
Ed not only lived an accomplished life, but a wonderful life, that we 
had the gift of sharing a part of that life with him, that his work lives 
on, that his role modeling of what it means to be a human being is 
still available to us, that his memory is so much a part of us, and that 
the pain we are experiencing will be mitigated with time.  For some, 
that pain will fade, but never completely go away.  I’m not sure that’s 





REMEMBERING ED BAKER 
Tobias Barrington Wolff*
Sitting at the top of my e-mail Inbox on my home computer are 
two messages from Ed Baker.  He sent them to me last spring, in re-
sponse to a paper that I had presented in workshop to the Penn fac-
ulty—a draft of a First Amendment article on which I have been 
working in one form or another for over ten years.  The article at-
tempts to say something about the proper analysis of free speech 
claims under the First Amendment when those claims are asserted by 
corporations and other artificial entities.  It pursues a set of instincts 
about the distinction between safeguarding individual autonomy and 
promoting robust public debate, along with the arguments for and 
against permitting artificial entities to invoke each species of claim in 
different speech situations.  I started work on the article about a year 
before I became a law professor, and I have come to think of it as the 
measure of my own learning curve in the field of free speech.  I have 
ripped it up and rewritten it several times; spun off another article 
from one part of the paper’s analysis; and, nonetheless, I am still 
painfully aware that I do not yet know enough to write this paper in 
the way it should be written. 
Ed’s e-mail comments came in response to the paper’s current in-
carnation—a stripped down version of what it has been at various 
points in the past, since it lacks both the sections that were spun off 
into another article and the sections that I excised upon returning to 
it this most recent time and concluding that substantial portions were 
not yet right.  The Penn faculty, as always, were excellent in work-
shop, engaging with the elements of the project in which they saw 
genuine value and pushing me to improve my thinking in the parts 
that were still rough.  But Ed had been unable to attend my workshop 
presentation.  If memory serves, he was in New York that day.  In-
stead, he read the draft and offered me his reactions in written form. 
I have not been ready to give Ed’s e-mails the attention they de-
serve, hence their presence atop my Inbox these many months.  My 
head has been filled with Civil Procedure, Federal Jurisdiction, and 
Conflict of Laws since last summer, and I have promised myself that 
 * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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in my next engagement with this First Amendment article I will spend 
as much time educating myself and refining my thoughts as is neces-
sary to do the project justice.  Ed spoke to me in that mode in his e-
mails—as a colleague and equal capable of engaging with free speech 
doctrine and theory at the highest level.  A scholar with proper re-
spect for his avocation does not approach such a conversation un-
prepared.  And so Ed’s e-mails have sat conspicuously atop my Inbox 
as a reminder of the major endeavor that I have waiting for me, and 
of the great mind that will be there to help guide me, with character-
istic generosity, to a deeper understanding of my own instincts about 
this indispensable provision of our Constitution. 
It will perhaps not be difficult to understand, therefore, that Ed’s 
e-mails have now taken on an elegiac quality.  I will not enjoy the 
benefit of that great mind in my further efforts to understand the 
First Amendment.  Ed Baker made perhaps the most earnest, pas-
sionate, and thorough attempt to use the autonomy of the individual 
as a basis for justifying free speech theory and structuring First 
Amendment doctrine that any scholar has contributed to the modern 
canon.  When I joined the Penn faculty three years ago, Ed Baker’s 
colleagueship was like a vein of ore to me—a source of wealth that I 
would mine, just as soon as I was ready.  But now that treasure has re-
ceded beyond reach. 
I did not know Ed well.  We had several rich conversations about 
the law after I arrived at Penn in 2007.  On two immensely gratifying 
occasions—once in response to a presentation that I made of another 
First Amendment article, and once when he agreed to sign an amicus 
brief that I had written to a federal appeals court—Ed praised me for 
having provided insights that were new to him and had changed his 
way of thinking about a pair of free speech issues.  But I don’t believe 
that we ever shared a meal together outside the halls of the law 
school, and I knew little about him beyond his work.  It is one of the 
passages that marks the transition from young scholar to mature aca-
demic, I think, when one begins approaching senior colleagues not 
merely as intellectual mentors but also as friends.  Though I have 
found some of my closest friendships in the academy in these last ten 
years, that transition came more slowly for me in approaching Ed.  
He was notoriously private and inscrutable, which perhaps accounts 
for a part of that lost opportunity, but he was so palpably tender-
hearted and compassionate that any colleague must assume equal re-
sponsibility for not finding a space to share with him. 
The work that Ed Baker leaves behind will be a legacy of which 
any scholar would be proud, and I will turn to that work frequently as 
I continue trying to form myself into a respectable First Amendment 
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scholar.  But Ed’s e-mails will always serve as a more personal re-
minder to me of what I have lost:  a great mind; a generous colleague; 
and a close friend and co-venturer that could have been. 
